@techreport{ilprints610,
          number = {2003-51},
           month = {August},
          author = {Neil Daswani and Hector Garcia-Molina},
           title = {Pong-Cache Poisoning in GUESS (Extended Technical Report)},
            type = {Technical Report},
       publisher = {Stanford},
     institution = {Stanford InfoLab},
            year = {2003},
        keywords = {peer-to-peer, security},
             url = {http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/610/},
        abstract = {This paper studies the problem of resource discovery in unstructured peer-to-peer (P2P) systems.  We propose simple policies that make the discovery of resources resilient to coordinated attacks by malicious nodes.  We focus on a novel P2P protocol called GUESS that uses a pong cache, a set of currently known nodes, to discover new ones.  We describe how to limit pong cache poisoning, a condition in which the ids of malicious nodes appear in the pong caches of good nodes.  We propose adding an introduction protocol (IP) as a basic mechanism to GUESS to ensure liveness.  We suggest using a most-recently-used (MRU) cache replacement policy to slow down the rate of poisoning, and an ID smearing algorithm (IDSA) to limit poisoning in the steady-state.  We also determine the marginal utility of using a malicious node detector (MND) to further limit poisoning, and the level of accuracy required of the detector.}
}